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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1951-1952
may, therefore, have envisioned the presentation of a future case
in which the unrelated and non-exempt uses might have consti-
tuted an even larger portion of the total use.
In the foregoing case, the question of exemption was raised
in the customary manner by filing objections in the county court.
A reverse situation is presented in the case of Goodyear Rubber
Company v. Tierney7s where the plaintiff sought to assert an
exemption by means of a declaratory judgment proceeding but
was held to be precluded from such remedy because a more cus-
tomary statutory remedy was available. 79  The plaintiff, lessee
of property owned by the federal government, had urged that the
assessment was against the fee interest, whereas the defendant
had contended that the assessment was made against the lease-
hold interest of the plaintiff, as permitted under Section 26 of
the Revenue Act.80 The court, holding that a suit for declaratory
judgment could not be maintained, distinguished the cases in-
volving the use of an injunction, offered by the plaintiff by way
of analogy, as being applicable only where the property was totally
exempt or where the tax had already been assessed and con-
structive fraud was present. This resolution of a question here-
tofore unanswered in Illinois was made in accordance with the
general weight of authority throughout the country."'
VIII. TORTS
Save for those torts cases which have been more appropriately
discussed in connection with other sections of this survey,' no
cases of transcendental importance arose during the year in that
78411 Ill. 421, 104 N. E. (2d) 222 (1952), noted in 40 Ill. B. J. 535.
79 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 675, provides for the payment of taxes
under protest and for objection in the county court.
80 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 507, provides: "When real estate which
is exempt from taxation is leased to another whose property is not exempt, and
the leasing of which does not make the real estate taxable, the leasehold estate
and the appurtenances shall be listed as the property of the lessee thereof, or his
assignee, as real estate."
8' See, for example, Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 131 A. 265 (1925). See also
Borcbard, Declaratory Judgments, 2d Ed., pp. 320 and 342.
1 See Division I for tort cases growing out of the master-servant relationship;
Division V for those connected with the family; and Division VI regarding wrongs
arising from property.
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area of the law which deals with delictual conduct and its civil
consequences. A few negligence cases, however, might be said to
be of significance. In Beadles v. Servel, Inc.2 for example, the
tort liability of the manufacturer of a gas refrigerator, for a
defect in its construction, was carried over so as to permit re-
covery by a second-hand purchaser thereof on the theory that
one who makes an inherently dangerous article should be liable
to those whom he should expect would "use the chattel or
be in the vicinity of its probable use.""
The standard of care to be expected of operators of motor
vehicles was considered in two cases. In one of them, that of
Cockrell v. Sullivan,4 the owner of an automobile who had failed
to comply with a provision of the Motor Vehicle Act,5 in that he
had left the car unattended without first locking the ignition and
removing the key, was absolved from liability for harm inflicted
by a thief fleeing therein when the Appellate Court for the Third
District took a position directly opposed to the majority opinion
of the First District in the case of Ostergard v. Frisch." The
situation would now seem ripe for determination by the Supreme
Court. In the other case, that of Van Cleave v. Illini Coach Com-
pany,7 the prime issue was the degree of care to be expected from
an operator of a school bus for the safety of its non-paying
student passengers. The Appellate Court for the Third District
likened the duty of a person engaged in the transportation of
school children to something akin to that of a common carrier.8
Responsibilities of real property owners were considered in
2344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N. E. (2d) 405 (1951), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KuNT LAW
RnvIEw 168.
3 344 Ill. App. 133 at 145, 100 N. E. (2d) 405 at 411.
4 344 Ill. App. 620, 101 N. E. (2d) 878 (1951), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIFw 277.
5 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 95Y2, § 189(a).
6 333 Ill. App. 359,'77 N. E. (2d) 537 (1948), noted in 27 CMCAGo-KENT LAW
RL-vEw 225. It is understood that the Appellate Court for the First District, not
in the period of this survey, reaffirmed its position on the point through the medium
of the case of Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 348 Ill. App. 161, 108 N. E. (2d) 508 (1952).
7 344 Ill. App. 175, 100 N. E. (2d) 398 (1951), noted in 30 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW
RETrnw 190.
8 Lacking any Illinois precedent, the court followed a view adopted in Webb v.
City of Seattle, 22 Wash. (2d) 596, 157 P. (2d) 312 (1945).
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three other cases. In the first, that of Jackson v. 919 Corporation,"
a pedestrian was struck and injured by a plate glass store window
which broke as she passed by. Despite the fact the lease to the
premises contained no covenant to repair nor any reservation of
a right to enter the premises, the pedestrian sought to hold the
lessor jointly liable with the lessee and the building manager on
the theory the lessor had washed the windows and made periodic
inspections of the exterior of the building, although under no
covenant to do so, hence had thereby exercised a degree of control.
The Appellate Court for the First District, relying on an Oregon
case10 which had held that an express reservation of a right to
enter for purpose of inspection was inadequate to constitute
control by the landlord, concluded that the informal inspection
and other acts performed were inadequate to hold the lessor
responsible for the harm suffered.
In the second case, that of Page v. Ginsberg," the court relied
on one of the six exceptions to the general rule absolving lessors
from liability for defects in the demised premises1 2 to support
recovery by the lessee's wife for injuries sustained thereby when
it found that the lessor, for a specific consideration separate and
apart from the tenant's obligation to pay rent, had agreed to
repair a staircase but had failed to do so.' 3 The third case, that
of Wagner v. Kepler,'4 one treating with the question of whether
or not a month to month tenancy is to be regarded as continuous
or intermittent for purpose of establishing liability for injuries
caused by a nuisance developing after the original entry, has been
discussed elsewhere in this survey 15 but it should not be over-
looked in this connection.
9 341 Ill. App. 519, 101 N. E. (2d) 594 (1951). Leave to appeal has been denied.
10 Nash v. Gorltson, 174 Ore. 368, 149 P. (2d) 325 (1944).
11 345 Il1. App. 68, 102 N. E. (2d) 165 (1951), noted in 40 Ill. B. 3. 579. Leave
to appeal has been denied.
12 See Powell, Real Property, Vol. 2, § § 238-9.
13 While novel in Illinois, this exception has been recognized in many other
jurisdictions. See annotation in 163 A. L. R. 300.
14411 Il. 368, 104 N. E. (2d) 231 (1951), reversing 342 Ill. App. 136, 95 N. E.
(2d) 533 (1950).
15 See Division VI, Landlord and' Tenant, notes 34-5.
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While some dram shop cases have also been already exam-
ined 6 a somewhat related problem developing out of the case
of Padulo v. Schneider17 merits attention. The plaintiff there
charged a tavern keeper with common-law negligence in not pro-
tecting a female patron from being followed, and assaulted, by
another intoxicated patron. The gist of the plaintiff's complaint
was that the proprietor owed her a duty to protect her from
molestation, to warn her that she was about to be followed, and
also not to encourage her assailant to follow her in order to be
rid of him. A judgment sustaining a motion to strike the complaint
was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District when
it concluded the defendant was not to be regarded as an insurer
of the plaintiff's safety.
One concluding case attracts interest because of the novelty
of the theory advanced to sustain a cause of action. The plaintiff,
in Altepeter v. Virgil State Bank,18 being a customer of the
defendant bank, was shot and wounded while transacting business
in the bank premises when an armed robber attempted to perpe-
trate a hold-up of the bank. He contended the defendant was
negligent in not providing him with protection against an injury
of that character. The Appellate Court for the Second District,
affirming a judgment striking the complaint for failure to state
a cause of action, came to the conclusion that the proximate cause
of the injury sustained was the felonious act of an unknown bank
robber whose independent wilful or negligent conduct fell beyond
the boundary of reasonable anticipation by the defendant.
16 The cases of McClure v. Lence, 345 Ill. App. 158, 102 N. E. (2d) 546 (1951),
noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 273, 40 Ill. B. J. 464, and 65 Harv. L. Rev.
1456, and Zboinsky v. Wojcik, 347 Ill. App. 226, 106 N. B. (2d) 764 (1952), noted In
30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW Rsmrw 384, are discussed above: Division II, Contracts,
notes 3 to 10.
17 346 Ill. App. 454, 105 N. E. (2d) 115 (1952).
18 345 Ill. App. 585, 104 N. E. (2d) 334 (1952).
